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On January 9, 2001, the United States
Supreme Court issued a decision eagerly antic-
ipated by both environmentalists and industry
in the battle between clean water and eco-
nomic realities.  In Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,1 the Court considered statutory and
constitutional challenges to the federal regula-
tion of isolated wetlands. The Court ruled that
the Army Corps of Engineers' ("the Corps") def-
inition2 expanding its jurisdiction to isolated
wetlands that serve as habitat for migratory
birds extended beyond its authority under the
Clean Water Act.3 The Court found that the
Act's use of "navigable waters"4 indicated con-
gressional intent to exclude these types of wet-
lands from the Act's jurisdiction.5
By deciding this matter on purely statutory
grounds, the Court avoided the constitutional
argument that the Seventh Circuit relied on in
upholding the Corps’ wetlands definition.6
Consequently, the Court did not reach the
question of whether Congress had exceeded
its power in enacting the Clean Water Act and
in subsequently attempting to regulate isolat-
ed wetlands under the Commerce Clause.7
Furthermore, the Court, by focusing exclusive-
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1. 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) (hereinafter "SWANCC").
2. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs for the Corps of
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).  This def-
inition, commonly referred to as the Migratory Bird Rule, gave
the Corps permitting authority over wetlands with actual or
potential habitat for migratory birds.  
3. SWANCC, 121 S. Ct at 678.
4. Federal Water Pollution Control Act §404(a), 33 U.S.C.
§1344(a) (commonly known as the Clean Water Act).
5. SWANCC, 121 S. Ct at 680.
6. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999).
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
ond step of the Chevron8 analysis and an exam-
ination of the rationality of the Corps’ statuto-
ry interpretation as embodied in the Migratory
Bird Rule. 
The SWANCC opinion was contrary to the
expectations of many environmentalists, who
feared that the Court would take this opportu-
nity to examine the issue under the Commerce
Clause and determine that the Corps had erro-
neously relied on Congress’ wrongful delega-
tion of power to regulate isolated wetlands.
Such a holding would have been an opportuni-
ty for the Court to use the Constitution to chip
away at the Clean Water Act and to lay the
groundwork for an invalidation of the private
taking provisions of the Endangered Species
Act.9
This Comment examines the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence lead-
ing up to its and the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sions, culminating in the "non-application" of
the constitutional challenge in the SWANCC
case. Then, the Comment will turn to recent
Commerce Clause attacks on the Endangered
Species Act and what the SWANCC decision
means for the future of federal wildlife regula-
tion.
II. Modern Supreme Court Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence
The SWANCC decision comes during a sig-
nificant movement by the Supreme Court to
curtail congressional power and strictly define
the limits of federalism. Both United States v.
Lopez10 and United States v. Morrison11 represent
significant changes in the Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, as well as its growing
reluctance to allow Congress to push through
legislation that has only a tenuous connection
to interstate commercial activity. In SWANCC,
though the Court appropriately bypassed a
direct Commerce Clause challenge to the
Migratory Bird Rule.  The Court is unlikely to
allow the Endangered Species Act to survive
when a similar challenge arises. 
The Supreme Court in Lopez effectively
revived the Commerce Clause by finding that
Congress had exceeded its authority in passing
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
(“GFSZA”),12 which made it a federal crime to
possess a gun in a school zone.13 For the first
time in more than 60 years, the Court refused
to extend congressional power under the
Commerce Clause and found the GFSZA
unconstitutional.14 In doing so, the Court iden-
tified three types of activity that Congress may
regulate under the Commerce Clause: (1) the
use of channels of interstate commerce; (2) the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, even
if a threat to people or things comes only from
intrastate activities; and (3) activities having a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.15 In
order to determine which activities fall within
the last category, the Court must further exam-
ine (a) whether the statute controls a commer-
cial activity or some activity necessary to the
regulation of commercial or economic activity;
(b) whether the statute's language includes a
jurisdictional requirement ensuring that the
regulated activity affects interstate commerce;
and (c) how far the rationale for upholding the
statute extends.16 The Court found that the
GFSZA fell within this third category, but failed
to meet the enumerated requirements; most
significantly, the United States failed to make a
showing that the Act regulated an activity with
a substantial effect on interstate commerce.17
In Morrison,18 the Supreme Court further
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8. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984).  Under Chevron, a court's review of an
agency's statutory interpretation involves two steps.  First, the
court determines whether the plain meaning of a statute indi-
cates congressional intent to support or prohibit the regulation.
Second, if congressional intent is not clear,  the court determines
whether the agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable.
Id.
9. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538
(2000).
10. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
11. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
12. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (1995), amended by Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208.
13. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
14. Id. at 567.
15. Id. at 558. 
16. Id. at 563-64.
17. Id. at 561.
18. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 681 (2000).
Commerce Clause by invalidating the civil rem-
edy provision under the Violence Against
Women Act (“VAWA”),19 which allowed victims
to bring suit for gender-motivated violence in
federal court. By applying the Lopez test, the
Court found that though the VAWA sought to
regulate activities with a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, it failed to meet the
requirements for such authority because gen-
der-based violence is not an economic activi-
ty.20 "Lopez's review of Commerce Clause case
law demonstrates that in those cases where we
have sustained federal regulation of intrastate
activity based upon the activity's substantial
effects on interstate commerce, the activity in
question has been some sort of economic
endeavor."21 The Court noted that the statute's
economic rationale for the regulation of gen-
der-based crimes was far too attenuated, thus
precluding congressional regulation of non-
economic activity that is based solely on its
aggregate impact on interstate commerce.22
Therefore, under both Lopez and Morrison, if
a law rests solely on a tenuous connection to
interstate commerce, courts should not hesi-
tate to invalidate the regulation. Moreover,
"[t]he Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly
local."23 Given the historical and inherent
power of local governments to regulate land
use concerns, Lopez and Morrison together set a
precarious stage for the constitutionality of
federal environmental statutes, such as the
Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species
Act. The Migratory Bird Rule squeaked by the
Commerce Clause, although it suffered a
painful death at the hands of the Court's statu-
tory constructionists. In the hands of the cur-
rent Supreme Court, the Endangered Species
Act may not pass constitutional muster. 
III. The SWANCC Decision
The SWANCC case began several years ago
when the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County applied to the Corps for a landfill per-
mit. The agency wanted to create a solid waste
disposal installation in an area encompassing
a sand and gravel pit that was once part of a
strip mine.24 Left abandoned for more than 50
years, the former strip mine had evolved into a
wetland haven for wildlife and vegetation, nur-
turing nearly 170 different species of plants
and more than 100 species of birds.25 In addi-
tion, "[m]ost notably, the site is a seasonal
home to the second-largest breeding colony of
great blue herons in northeastern Illinois."26
Although the wetlands were isolated — "not
adjacent to bodies of open water"27 — the
Corps claimed jurisdiction over the site pur-
suant to the Migratory Bird Rule and declined
to issue the permit.28 The agency sued the
Corps, challenging its jurisdiction to regulate
the site and questioning the reasonableness of
the Migratory Bird Rule's interpretation of the
Clean Water Act.29
The Migratory Bird Rule resulted from a
1986 attempt to clarify the Corps' jurisdiction
over "navigable waters" under section 404(a) of
the Clean Water Act.30 The Act's own definition
of "navigable waters" is vaguely stated as "the
waters of the United States, including the terri-
torial seas."31 The Act does not provide further
guidance in determining which waters are sub-
ject to regulation under the federal statute. To
clarify these jurisdictional issues, the
Environmental Protection Agency and the
Corps defined "waters of the United States" to
include "intrastate lakes, rivers, streams














19. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b), (c) (2000). 
20. Id. at 673. 
21. Id. at 672. 
22. Id. at 673.
23. Id. at 676.
24. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1999).
25. Id.
26. Id. 
27. SWANCC, 121 S. Ct. 675, 680 (2001).  The Court previ-
ously decided that the Corps' jurisdiction under section 404 of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), extended to hydrologi-
cally connected wetlands.  United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
28. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 191 F.3d at 847.
29. Id. at 849.
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000). 
sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes,
wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds,
the use, degradation, or destruction of which
could affect interstate or foreign commerce."32
The Corps’ 1986 preamble codified its (and the
EPA's) longstanding assumption that its wet-
lands jurisdiction extended beyond those
activities with a potential effect on interstate
commerce in certain circumstances.33 The
Corps’ Migratory Bird Rule stated that "waters
of the United States . . . also include . . . waters
[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by
birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or
[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by
other migratory birds which cross state lines."34
As a result, the Corps’ rule extended "navigable
waters" to include intrastate wetlands "based
on their actual or potential use as habitat for
migratory birds."35
The Seventh Circuit upheld congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to regu-
late "navigable waters" under the Clean Water
Act and found the Migratory Bird Rule was a
reasonable interpretation of the Clean Water
Act's language.36 The court noted that
"throughout North America, millions of people
annually spend more than a billion dollars on
hunting, trapping, and observing migratory
birds. Yet the cumulative loss of wetlands has
reduced the populations of many species and
consequently the ability of people to hunt,
trap, and observe those birds."37 According to
the Seventh Circuit, these findings indicated a
substantial direct impact on interstate com-
merce, consistent with the Supreme Court's
holding in Lopez. 
Then, turning to the Chevron test, the court
found that 
the geographical scope of the [Clean
Water Act] is as broad as the
Commerce Clause allows. . . .
Accordingly, because Congress’ power
under the Commerce Clause is broad
enough to permit regulation of waters
based on the presence of migratory
birds, it is certainly reasonable for the
EPA and the Corps to interpret the Act
in such a manner.38
Moreover, the court found that the Act was
designed not only to protect national water
quality (as claimed by the plaintiffs), but also
to "restore and maintain the . . . physical and
biological integrity"39 of those waters.
Sustaining the Corps' jurisdiction, reasoned
the Seventh Circuit, would further those ends
as a matter of public policy.
In a five-to-four opinion, the Supreme
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision
on statutory construction grounds. The Court
construed the Clean Water Act's language to
avoid constitutional and federalism questions,
rejecting the request for agency deference.40 It
held that the Corps could not regulate isolated
wetlands through the Migratory Bird Rule
because the Act's language did not include
these wetlands in its definition of "navigable
waters."41 The Court concluded that extending
the Corps’ jurisdiction to seasonal wetlands
located wholly within two counties in Illinois
would effectively read "navigable" out of the
language of the Act.42 Although its decision in
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.43 rec-
ognized that the term, "navigable," was "of lim-
ited effect," thus permitting the Corps’ jurisdic-
tion over adjacent wetlands, the Court refused
to deny the term any effect whatsoever.44 "The
term 'navigable' at least has the import of
showing us what Congress had in mind as its
authority for enacting the Clean Water Act: its
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32. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2000).
33. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 191 F.3d at 847.
34. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs for the Corps of
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986). 
35. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 191 F.3d at 847.
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 849 (citing Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d
256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993)).
38. Id. at 851.
39. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)). 
40. SWANCC, 121 S. Ct. 675, 683 (2001).
41. Id. at 680.
42. Id. at 682-83.
43. 474 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1995).
44. SWANCC, 121 S. Ct. at 682.
had been navigable in fact or which could rea-
sonably be made so."45
The Court also rejected the Corps’ argu-
ment that Congress’ failure to pass subsequent
narrowing legislation represented acquies-
cence to their interpretation.46 In 1977, the
Corps adopted its current expansive definition
of "navigable waters" that includes isolated
wetlands and ponds.47 Congress was aware of
this broad interpretation when it adopted its
1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act, as
apparent in a failed bill that would have limit-
ed the Corps’ jurisdiction over waters of rea-
sonable or actual navigability.48 The Corps
argued that the bill's failure to pass indicated
congressional acceptance of a broad interpre-
tation of "navigable waters," including isolated,
non-navigable and intrastate bodies of water.49
The Court dismissed this argument, noting
that "[f]ailed legislative proposals are a 'partic-
ularly dangerous ground on which to rest an
interpretation of a prior statute.'"50 Proponents
of the use of such legislative history must over-
come a heavy burden of showing latent con-
gressional intent supercedes the plain lan-
guage, something the Corps was unable to
demonstrate.51
Although the Court did not reach the
Commerce Clause challenge to the Migratory
Bird Rule, it did suggest that the Corps’ inter-
pretation breached the outer limits of congres-
sional authority.52 The Corps had significant
support for extending the Commerce Clause
power to the regulation of bird-inhabited wet-
lands, particularly precedent recognizing that
migratory bird protection was a "national inter-
est of very nearly the first magnitude."53 Yet, the
Court found it was "not clear" whether the reg-
ulated activity or object, in the aggregate,
affects interstate commerce.54 Moreover, it was
indisputable that Congress intended to main-
tain local control over water resources and
land use issues.55 Thus, the Court determined
there was no clear congressional statement
justifying "federal jurisdiction over ponds and
mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird
Rule' [that] would result in a significant
impingement of the States' traditional and pri-
mary power over land and water use."56
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent,
attacked the Court for ignoring the purpose of
the Clean Water Act and questioned its con-
cern about breaching constitutional limits.57
The dissent noted that the Corps had historical
authority over navigable waters, so Congress
intended to broaden its reach under the Clean
Water Act to include the protection of "aes-
thetic, health, recreational and environmental
uses."58 Moreover, because of the Act's compre-
hensiveness, the Corps’ jurisdiction had to be
expanded as well.59
Thus, although Congress opted to carry
over the traditional jurisdictional term
"navigable waters" from . . . prior ver-
sions of the [Clean Water Act], it
broadened the definition of that term
to encompass all "waters of the United
States." Indeed, the 1972 conferees
arrived at the final formulation by
specifically deleting the word "naviga-
ble" from the definition that had origi-
nally appeared in the House version of















45. Id. at 683.
46. Id. at 681.
47. Id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(5) (1978)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994)).
51. Id. at 682.
52. Id. (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
53. Id. (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435
(1920)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 680 (noting the Clean Water Act preserved the
"primary responsibilities and rights of the state to prevent,
reduce and eliminate water pollution [and] to plan the develop-
ment and use . . . of land and water resources").
56. Id. at 684.
57. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justices Souter, Ginsburg
and Breyer joined the dissent.
58. Id. at 687.
59. Id.
60. Id.
Justice Stevens further reasoned that
Congress must have intended jurisdiction
under the Act to fall outside the traditional
area of navigation because federal authority
over navigation had already been long estab-
lished.61 "Why should Congress intend that its
assertion of federal jurisdiction be given the
'broadest possible constitutional interpreta-
tion' if it did not intend to reach beyond the
very heartland of its commerce power?"62
Convinced that the statutory construction
of the Act permits the Corps’ jurisdiction over
isolated wetlands, Justice Stevens then turned
to the Commerce Clause argument dodged by
the Court.63 The dissent concluded that the dis-
charge of fill material into isolated wetlands
inhabited by migratory birds substantially
affects interstate commerce, and thus was an
activity Congress may regulate under the
Commerce Clause.64 Unlike the activities regu-
lated in Lopez and Morrison, "the discharge of fill
material into the Nation's waters is almost
always undertaken for economic reasons."65
Moreover, the dumping of fill material
adversely affects the migratory bird population
in the aggregate and impairs bird-related
tourism.66 According to Justice Stevens, federal
authority here was proper because "the causal
connection between the filling of wetlands and
the decline of commercial activities associated
with migratory birds is not 'attenuated,' [but
instead] is direct and concrete."67
Although the Clean Water Act sidestepped
a direct Commerce Clause challenge, the
SWANCC decision is by no means a victory for
environmentalists. Despite the reasoning of
Justice Stevens and the Seventh Circuit, the
Court applied a very limited, constructionist
view of the Act to eviscerate federal wetlands
regulation. Moreover, environmentalists can
derive no comfort from the Court's dodging of
the constitutional issue this time — it is all too
possible that the Clean Water Act will not sur-
vive a direct Commerce Clause challenge. Most
significantly, the question of whether the
Endangered Species Act is a valid congression-
al exercise of the Commerce Clause remains
open to scrunity by a post-SWANCC Court.
IV. The Endangered Species Act and the
Commerce Clause 
Very few lower courts have addressed
Commerce Clause challenges to the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA") under the
Lopez analysis. Of those courts, none has found
that Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause in enacting the ESA.68
Although the Supreme Court avoided the
Commerce Clause challenge in SWANCC, a
court would be unable to rely on statutory con-
struction to bypass a similar attack on the ESA. 
For example, the D.C. Circuit directly
addressed the Commerce Clause issue in
National Association of Homebuilders v. Babbitt.69 By a
two-to-one vote, the three-judge panel upheld
the constitutionality of the ESA's prohibition
on the private taking of a protected species.
The case involved a group of land developers
and local governments seeking to build a hos-
pital in an area inhabited by the geographical-
ly isolated and critically endangered Delhi
Sands Flower-Loving Fly.70 The fly's habitat had
shrunk by 97 percent as a result of urban devel-
opment and pollution, and was currently
believed to exist only in a forty square-mile
area straddling two counties, entirely within
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61. Id. (citing The Daniel Ball, 19 L. Ed. 999 (1871); Gilman
v. Philadelphia, 18 L. Ed. 96 (1866); Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 L. Ed. 23
(1824)). 
62. Id.
63. Id. at 693-94.
64. Id. at 694.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 694-95.
67. Id. at 695 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 612 (2000); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492-93 (4th Cir.
2000)). 
68. See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.1997);
Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995);
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmties. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
69. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
70. Id. at 1044.
71. Id. 
construction would have wiped out the entire
population and habitat of the species, violat-
ing section 9(a)(1)(B) of the ESA.72
The D.C. Circuit upheld the constitutional-
ity of the ESA, although it issued three sepa-
rate opinions. Judge Wald rejected the
Commerce Clause challenge to the ESA by
examining the potential effect of the extinction
of endangered species in three areas. First, the
section 9 "takings" provision regulates the use
of channels of interstate commerce, meeting
the first prong of the Lopez test.73 Judge Wald
found that the government's regulation of
transportation of endangered species was nec-
essary to "keep the channels of interstate com-
merce free from immoral and injurious uses."74
Second, the prohibition regulates an activity
with a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce because it prevents the destruction of
biodiversity.75 This protects current and future
interstate commerce, including significant eco-
nomic benefits derived from potential medical
uses of species.76 Judge Wald interpreted Lopez
to mean that regulated activity need not be
"commercial in character," but rather must only
affect interstate commerce.77 This effect can be
determined by examination of the legislative
history regarding the value of biodiversity and
potential for future commerce.78 Lastly, in
examining scientific studies, Judge Wald found
a sufficiently rational basis for Congress’ find-
ing that "takings [of endangered species]
would have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce by depriving commercial actors of
access to an important natural resource — bio-
diversity."79
Judge Henderson concurred with the judg-
ment, finding that a loss of biodiversity itself
can have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.80 However, she disagreed with
Judge Wald's reasoning on two grounds. First,
she noted that endangered species, which are
not commercially marketable goods, cannot be
regulated as channels of commerce.81 Second,
Judge Henderson found that the medical
impact of the loss of diversity, as well as the
resulting economic benefit, is too speculative
to serve as the basis for a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.82 Instead, she found that
the lynchpin of interstate commerce could be
found in the nature of the taking itself.
According to Judge Henderson, the restriction
imposed on the hospital construction under
the ESA substantially affects interstate com-
merce because it "relates to both the proposed
redesigned traffic intersection and the hospital
it is intended to serve, each of which has an
obvious connection with interstate com-
merce."83
In his dissent, Judge Sentelle determined
the ESA improperly extends congressional
authority to regulate commercial activity. Judge
Sentelle argued that any link drawn between
the hospital's construction and interstate com-
merce was far too attenuated to support feder-
al government intervention,84 and that the
court's inability to agree on its source within
Lopez indicated the ESA's invalidity.85 Judge
Sentelle rejected the "substantial effects"
analyses used by the other two members of the
panel and concluded that section 9 of the ESA
is unconstitutional based on the three-part
Lopez test.86 First, the ESA does not regulate an
economic activity.87 Second, like the statute in
Lopez, the ESA contains no jurisdictional provi-
sion that would ensure its application would
only reach activities affecting interstate com-
merce.88 Third, the medical impact of the loss
of biodiversity is too speculative to support














72. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).  This section prohibits the
private "taking" of a listed species.
73. Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders, 130 F.3d at 1046.
74. Id. at 1046-47 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 214, 246 (1964)).
75. Id. at 1053.
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 1056.
78. Id. at 1055.
79. Id. at 1056.
80. Id. at 1057 (Henderson, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 1058.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1059. 
84. Id. at 1062 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1064.
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 1064-65.
theories that lack a "logical stopping point" to
limit its scope.89 To uphold the ESA under this
rationale, according to Judge Sentelle, would
not only ignore Lopez, but would also transform
the Commerce Clause into the "hey-you-can-
do-whatever-you-feel-like clause."90
Even more recently, the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered a Commerce Clause challenge to the
ESA in Gibbs v. Babbitt.93 In Gibbs, the plaintiffs, a
group of private landowners and municipali-
ties, challenged a Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS") regulation prohibiting the taking of
critically endangered red wolves on private
land,94 claiming that the prohibition represent-
ed an improper extension of federal jurisdic-
tion under the Commerce Clause. The court
disagreed, holding that the FWS reasonably
concluded that the prohibition extended to
economic activity under the third prong of the
Lopez test.95
The court concluded that the regulated
activity — the taking of wolves on private prop-
erty — is economic, because the need to pro-
tect commercial assets, such as livestock,
drives the unlawful taking of the species.96
Moreover, "[t]he relationship between red wolf
takings and interstate commerce is quite direct
— with no red wolves, there will be no red wolf-
related tourism, no scientific research, and no
commercial trade in pelts."97 Given this eco-
nomic nature, and the regulation's role in the
broader statutory scheme of the ESA, the indi-
vidual taking of a wolf could, in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce for
Commerce Clause purposes.97 Accordingly, the
court upheld the regulation, because "invali-
dating this provision would call into question
the historic power of the federal government to
preserve scarce resources in one locality for the
future benefit of all Americans."99
The dissent argued that the FWS regulation
was unconstitutional under Lopez because the
taking of wolves on private property would not
even marginally constitute an economic activi-
ty for Commerce Clause purposes.100 Judge
Luttig attacked the majority decision for treat-
ing both Lopez and Morrison as aberrations and
for ignoring the requirements of economic
activity, interstate characteristics and jurisdic-
tional nexus.101 "The affirmative reach and the
negative limits of the Commerce Clause do not
wax and wane depending upon the subject
matter of the particular legislation under chal-
lenge."102
V. Potential Impact on the Endangered
Species Act
Although the Clean Water Act slipped by a
direct attack, the stage seems to be set for a
constitutional challenge to the Endangered
Species Act.103 The Supreme Court's recent his-
tory of increasingly anti-environmentalist, pro-
development decisions compounds the likeli-
hood of a direct challenge to the ESA.104 If the
Court grants review to a similar case challeng-
ing congressional power under the Commerce
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89. Id. at 1065.
90. Id. (quoting Judge Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume
19, 19 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (1995)). 
91. Id. at 1063.
92. Id.
93. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, Gibbs v. Norton,
69 U.S.L.W. 3383 (U.S. Feb 20, 2001) (No. 00-844).
94. 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c). 
95. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492. 
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 493.
99. Id. at 492.  Also driving the court's decision was a
reluctance to deviate since other courts "uniformly upheld
endangered species legislation . . . based on many of the same
current and future connections to interstate commerce articulat-
ed here."  Id. at 496.
100. Id. at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 510.
103. The Supreme Court is aware of these Commerce
Clause challenges to the ESA — witness Justice Stevens's use of
Gibbs in the dissent in the SWANCC case.  121 S. Ct. 675, 695
(2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Also, the plaintiff in Gibbs filed
for petition for certiorari with the Court in November.  Gibbs, 214
F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3383 (U.S.
Nov. 20, 2000) (No. 00-844), cert. denied, Gibbs v. Norton, 69
U.S.L.W. 3383 (U.S. Feb 20, 2001) (No. 00-844).
104. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S.
726 (1998); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725
(1997); Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996); Or.
Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994);
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992). 
ESA, it will not be able to duck the larger con-
stitutional question by ruling on strictly statu-
tory grounds as in SWANCC. The Court will be
obliged to meet head-on an essentially facial
challenge to the ESA and to decide the issue of
whether Congress overstepped its power in
drafting the statute. 
Environmentalists have good reason to
fear that this type of challenge will arise to
extinguish the Endangered Species Act alto-
gether. This invalidation would inevitably lead
to increased local control based on regional
perceptions of the value of endangered species
versus the benefits of development and
resource use. These regional differences in turn
would be the death knell for many threatened
species, creating an unpredictable ripple effect
on other species and fragile ecosystems.
SWANCC represents a small window of
hope to environmentalists who feared the
worst about the Court's intentions. Rather than
lay clear precedent for a successful Commerce
Clause challenge to the Endangered Species
Act, the Court chose to sidestep the issue alto-
gether and issued a purely statutory ruling. A
cynic might assert that the Court has merely
decided to wait for direct challenges to federal
environmental statutes once it has a more
supportive administration behind it.
Alternatively, the Court's decision may implic-
itly indicate its lack of intent to make such
drastic rulings or its extreme caution when
dealing with critical and highly politicized
issues. 
Nevertheless, the SWANCC decision was
not good news from an environmentalist
standpoint. The ruling removes isolated wet-
lands from federal jurisdiction, striking a crip-
pling blow against conservationist concerns
and the protection of affected species and
habitats. In enacting the Endangered Species
Act, Congress has already indicated that it per-
ceives a value in biodiversity that supersedes
certain local economic interests. Whether or
not the Court will support this legislative prior-
ity remains to be determined. 
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